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The Growth Obsession* 
 
Elmar Altvater** 
 
In pre-capitalist and pre-industrial times economic growth was dependent on population 
growth which, in turn, depended B this was the rationale behind Malthus= theory B on the 
supply of goods and services for subsistence and reproduction. Angus Maddison in a 
recently published OECD-study showed that in the first millennium after Christ from 0 to 
1000 the world population grew at an average annual rate of 0,02% from 230,8 million to 
268,3 million. From 1000 to 1820 the number increased to 1041,1 million. The same with 
GDP per capita: in the first millennium there was from 0 to 1000 a slight decrease from 
444 to 435 1990 international dollarsi, and from 1000 to 1820 an increase to 667 
international dollars per capita. It is interesting that in the first millennium the income 
divergences between Western Europe, Japan, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa 
and Asia were very small. Per capita-income reaches at the end of the first millennium 
from 400 dollar (Western Europe) to 450 dollar in Asia (excluding Japan). In the second 
millennium, however, the divergence of per capita incomes increased remarkably. In 
1820 the average per capita income in Western Europe reached 1232 dollars; in Africa it 
was the same as 820 years before: 418 dollars.ii  
 
                                            
*Paper presented at Research Center on Development and International Relations, Aalborg University, 
April 2001. This paper is slightly different from a publication under the same title in `Socialist RegisterA, 
edited by Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, The Merlin Press, London, 2002. I am very grateful to Colin 
Leys for his endeavour to bring the text into readable English 
** Elmar Altvater is Professor at Free University, Berlin, Germany. 
But since the Industrial Revolution GDP growth has been propelled by the dynamic 
development of the productive forces, i.e. by increased (labour) productivity. From the 
second half of the 19th century average growth rates increased remarkably. This growth, 
however, has been extremely uneven over time and in space, and has failed to narrow 
the inequalities between peoples and regions in a globalising world. This also is obvious 
in the numbers provided by Angus Maddison. Average per capita income increased from 
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1820 to 1998, i.e. in only 178 years and not in the course of a full millennium, from 667 
to 5709 1990 international dollars. The distribution of incomes in the same period 
became more uneven. In 1998 average per capita income in Western Europe was 
17921 dollars, in the Western Offshoots (USA, Canada etc.) it was 26146 dollars, in Asia 
(excluding Japan) it was 2936 dollars and in Africa 1368 dollars.iii 
 
Ignoring all evidence to the contrary, however, a recent World Bank report reached the 
remarkable conclusion that >growth is good for the poor=, i.e. that faster growth is not 
widening but closing the gap between rich and poor B and moreover not as the effect of 
a >trickle-down= process; the report alleges the existence of a >1-to-1-relation= between 
growth and poverty-reduction.iv The World Bank report is thus very optimistic with regard 
to the distributional effects of economic growth.v Yet even this bizarre (and strongly 
contested) conclusion does not touch upon the all-important question of whether 
economic growth is sustainable, economically as well as socially and ecologically. The 
following sections discuss the economic, ecological and financial limits to growth and 
address the question of why quantitative growth is so crucial for the capitalist system. 
 
1 Growth Triumphant? 
In the history of industrial capitalism, and in particular during the second half of the 20th 
century under the rule of >Fordism=, economic growth can be said to have been 
>triumphant=vi B owing to the ever more efficient mobilisation of productive resources. 
Between 1950 and 1973 (the year of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the 
>oil crisis=), growth rates nearly everywhere in the world reached levels unprecedented in 
human history, tempting Richard Easterlin to predict that >[t]he futureY to which the 
epoch of modern economic growth is leading is one of never ending economic growth, a 
world in which ever growing abundance is matched by ever rising aspirations=.vii Yet the 
assumption that physical inputs can expand indefinitely and produce an ever growing 
real output is >ecological nonsense B nothing physical can grow indefinitely=.viii The 
statement >growth forever= therefore only makes sense if the growth that Easterlin and 
other growth-enthusiasts have in mind is mere monetary growth (known as inflation), or 
a purely virtual >new= economy (without transportation, material production, and physical 
consumption of resources). And indeed these notions are often invoked in arguments 
that try to reconcile ecological sustainability with the requirements of a capitalist growth 
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economy.ix 
 
Yet in both recent economic history and contemporary economic theory enthusiasm for 
growth is anything but  marginal. For one thing it follows from the  >Eurocentric logic=x of 
quantitative growth, i.e. of an acceleration in time and expansion in space (>time-space-
compression=, as David Harvey calls it)xi that is responsible for the contemporary process 
of globalisation. It is important to note, however, that in this line of thought it is not simply 
>growth= that matters but efficient growth. Capital does not like disorderly growth; it needs 
growth which serves the end of profitability. Conversely, profitability is the motor of 
growth. Therefore, not only the growth rate of GDP counts but also the profit rate and the 
accumulation rate. This raises complicated theoretical and methodological questions, 
especially in the era of globalisation when it is no longer the national economy (or a 
given sector, such as manufacturing) which defines the arena for the formation of an 
average rate of profit.xii Since surplus profits can be generated by both advanced 
productivity and low labour costs, the same profit rate may result from very different 
constellations of productivity, wages, and capital-labour relations. The social implications 
of >growth= become indeterminate under these conditions. 
 
Furthermore, in this line of thought the performance of the >real economy= is usually 
interpreted without reference to financial globalisation. This approach is seriously flawed 
because monetary capital is more mobile and flexible than ever before. Investment 
decisions (and therefore also growth rates) are not only determined by (industrial) profit 
rates but also by the global interest rates on financial assets. Since under conditions of 
financial globalisation accumulation no longer necessarily takes place in the real 
economy, the relation between surplus value, profits, accumulation and real GDP-growth 
has become much looser. Under certain circumstances it is now more profitable to 
accumulate financial assets than to invest in real projects. Thus, prices of financial 
assets are inflated whereas commodity-prices (in particular in manufacturing, as shown 
by Duménil and Lévy)xiii are deflated B at least relative to the price index of GDP. The 
broken link between real and monetary accumulation manifests itself as a paradoxical 
>inflationary deflation=.xiv 
 
A second general reason why most social scientists and politicians obsessively preach 
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the ideology of triumphant growth is the idea that economic growth increases 
employment, incomes and taxes, and in this way provides resources for the alleviation of 
social conflicts, the expansion of development assistance, the eradication of poverty, the 
implementation of environmental standards, and so on. Steady growth was indeed the 
backbone of the corporatist >Keynesian class compromise= associated with the >Fordist= 
mode of regulation that characterised developed capitalism during the post-war period; 
and it is also assumed to offer a remedy for backwardness in the less-developed world B 
the argument of >modernisation= theory. Thus a recent article dedicated to the benefits of 
the >Washington Consensus= declares: >Without investment there is no economic growth, 
and without economic growth there is no sustainable economic policy Y=.xv The idea that 
there could be a mode of social cohesion other than the capitalist one based on high 
economic growth is, naturally, not considered.  
 
Given these two mutually reinforcing general reasons for the obsession with growth, it is 
not surprising that disseminating policy proposals for the stimulation of growth is a 
common preoccupation of economists, whether they work within the Keynesian tradition 
or are of a more neo-classical and neoliberal persuasion.xvi Even many ecological 
economists also believe that it is not economic growth, but economic stagnation, that 
harms the environment.xvii This may not be entirely false with respect to >dirty=, i.e. visible 
and perceptible, pollution. However, >clean= life style-pollution, e.g. the emission of 
greenhouse gases or the >externalisation= of ecologically destructive effects into remote 
areas or into the far future (nuclear waste; the consequences of mobility and tourism 
etc.), is without doubt also a side-effect of growth and welfare creation.xviii  
 
In addition, as Immanuel Wallerstein has pointed out, growth-mania is of a systemic 
nature: it is enshrined in the institutions which allow the system to function as a >totality=: 
>Capitalism as a historical system is defined by the fact that it makes structurally central 
and primary the endless accumulation of capital. This means that the institutions, which 
constitute its framework, reward those who pursue the endless accumulation of capital 
and penalize those who don=t.=xix Since the accumulation of capital is driven on by (the 
anticipation of) profits, Wallerstein=s statement really summarises the >grand narrative= of 
the modern capitalist system: the processes of profit-making, accumulation, and 
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institutional regulation, which give a degree of security to the system, simultaneously 
produce insecurity on all levels of social and individual life.  
 
Wallerstein is confident that the contemporary long cycle of accumulation which has 
lasted for over a century will soon come to an end, and that capitalism will then enter a 
stage of systemic crisis. It is true that growth mania has no real ground in the real 
economy. But the continued construction of institutions that emphasise growth and 
further instil the profit motive in individual capitalists needs to be  understood as an 
attempt to maintain social, economic and social stability and avoid a radical, 
>paradigmatic= change. Whether it is dressed up as >modernity= or >post-modernity=, 
whether it appeals to a >Third Way= or a >new economy= or as a rationale for overcoming 
backwardness, growth mania is nothing but a conservative reaction to the >systemic 
crisis= identified by Wallerstein. 
 
2 Disembedding 
The transition to a >growth economy= in the 19th century was just one aspect of the 
ongoing >great transformation=of pre-capitalist social forms into a capitalist market 
economy.xx The combination of commodification processes, the circulation-facilitating 
function of money and the ready availability of fuels formed a perfect >trinity= that sparked 
capital=s acceleration in time and expansion in space, i.e. accumulation and growth.xxi 
Markets have existed ever since peoples began to exchange products, but until the 
capitalist mode of production emerged markets remained >slow= and growth rates low. 
Capitalism established a social, economic, political, cultural foundation, and the requisite 
sources of energy, which allowed for the mobilisation and development of productive 
forces on a hitherto unknown scale. In the course of the >primitive accumulation of 
capital=, economic growth emancipated itself from the limited energy supply afforded by 
living labour. Thereafter, throughout the history of capitalism, workers have been 
replaced by means of production fuelled by (mainly) fossil energy. This process has 
been analysed as the >real subsumption of labor or the >production of relative surplus 
value=.xxii Capital and its institutions went through a process of >autonomisation= 
(>Verselbständigung=) vis-à-vis society (e.g. population growth, human needs) and social 
control. This was the process conceptualised by Polanyi as the >disembeddin g= of the 
market from the social system and from nature;xxiii the former then imposed its logic B i.e. 
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the rule of commodities, money and capital B on the latter. Today, we have to be aware 
that, firstly, the process of disembedding was by no means a unique event of the 
19thcentury; and, secondly, that the continuing process of disembedding embraces 
money in its many different forms and functions. Money not only circulates goods and 
services in >ordinary markets=; as credit it obeys not only the rules of the real economy 
but also the >logic= of a disembedded financial system operating on a global scale, 
partially disconnected from the real economy and increasingly serving to finance not only 
real (domestic and foreign) investment but also speculation.  
 
Modern financial instruments are almost entirely disconnected from the real economy. 
As a result, it is possible for growth rates of turnover of financial assets to be many times 
higher than the growth of any indicator of >real= activity. However, the disembedded 
financial sphere has certainly not become irrelevant to the functioning of the real 
economy or society. On the contrary, globally formed interest rates on financial assets 
require matching real growth rates and in this way exert a severe pressure on the real 
economy, on the society and on political organisations and movements.  
 
3 Economic Limits to Growth 
Economic growth is the result of a process of the transformation of energy and matter. In 
Marxian terms this is the concrete and use-value aspect of growth. From this 
perspective, it should be evident that growth has its limits. After all, planet Earth=s stocks 
of energy and matter are limited. We will discuss this in the next section. But economic 
growth is also the outcome of a social production process ruled by money (through the 
interest rate) and capital (through the profit rate). In the long run, capital requires a 
>geometric= growth of inputs in order to maintain stable (relative) growth rates. 3 percent 
of an absolute amount of 100 (e.g. bn $) is absolutely 3 bn; but 3 percent of 1000 is 
absolutely 10 times more. When these amounts represent real goods and services they 
indicate that high rates of (real) economic growth can only be sustained for a certain 
period of time. For, the long-run geometric growth of absolute quantities is an absurd 
idea. Nevertheless, the maintenance of high  interest rates requires nothing less than the 
realisation of precisely this absurdity and the dominant growth discourse presents it as a 
socially and economically feasible objective. 
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Statistical evidence (see table 1) shows that (a) the absolute increases of GDP in highly 
developed countries remained positive and rather stable since the beginning of the 
1960s (with merely cyclical fluctuations); and that (b) in the 1990s real increases were 
not only smaller in absolute terms, but were also achieved on the basis of an already 
higher level of real GDP. Growth rates inevitably declined. 
 
Germany until 1989 West Germany only; Italy: 1000 Bn Lira; Japan: 100 Bn Yen 
Source: Council of Economic Advisers (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung 
degesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Jahresgutachten 1997/98, Tabelle 3*; author=s 
calculations) 
In Germany the highest increase in real GDP occurred in 1968, after the >small= crisis of 
1966-67; DM 102 billions translated into a real growth rate of GDP of 7.46%. In 1988 the 
same absolute surplus would have produced a growth rate of only 4.43%. The surplus 
actually achieved in that year equalled no more than DM 83.4 billions. The real growth 
rate was 3.62%, still rather high by historical standards. In the USA, the highest absolute 
increase in GDP (US$ 327.4 billion) during the period under investigation occurred in 
1983; the real rate of growth for that year was 7.00%. In 1996 the same real surplus 
would have produced a growth rate of 4.99%. In reality, GDP in that year grew only by a 
(still respectable) 2.76%. 
 
Table 1 
Absolute increases of real GDP (1991 prices) in billions of national currency; annual 
averages 
 
 
Period/ 
Country (Currency) 
 
 
1960-69 
 
1970-79
 
1980-89
 
1990-96** 
 
1960-96
 
Germany (DM) 
 
46.92 
 
45.52
 
36.64
 
76.3 
 
46.15*
 
France (FF) 
 
140.1 
 
139.31
 
123.3
 
68.35 
 
134.19
 
Italy (LIT) 
 
29.94 
 
29.61
 
24.97
 
9.13 
 
28.25
 
Great Britain (BP) 
 
8.26 
 
8.85
 
13.37
 
6.88 
 
9.56
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Japan (YEN) 11.98 9.68 12.18 7.02 11.27
 
USA (US$) 
 
110.05 
 
120
 
140.83
 
120.13 
 
122.72
*  1960-1989 only 
** Since 1990 unified Germany 
 
In his long-term analysis of economic growth, Angus Maddison has measured the impact 
of labour productivity, hours worked and capital productivity on the annual average 
compounded growth rate. He shows that >over the long term, working hours of the 
average person fell by half; labour input increased less than population...= His findings 
clearly underline the positive relation between labour productivity and economic growth. 
>[L]abour productivity=, he continues, >rose a good deal faster than GDP per capita. From 
1820 to 1992 Japanese labour productivity rose 46-fold compared with a 28-fold 
increase in per capita GDP=.xxiv  
 
But although labour productivity has obviously been the main motor of growth in the last 
century, a look at the growth figures since 1950 reveals that (1) total factor productivity 
fell in all countries under consideration, that (2) the capital-labour ratio increased until 
the mid 1970s and has decreased since then, and that (3) the capital coefficient 
increased (i.e. >capital productivity= declined remarkably). The impact of the factors 
mentioned on the profit rate is negative. For the profit rate depends positively (1) on a 
distribution of income in favour of capital, i.e. on low real wages per worker; (2) on an 
increase in labour productivity; and negatively (3) on a growing capital-labour ratio 
(which, in value terms, indicates the rising organic composition of capital). In the long 
run, the profit rate tends to decline (as Marx showed), but of course this decline is 
cyclically modified. Therefore, during the last decade of wild deregulation, flexibilisation 
and mobilisation of all factors of production (i.e. of high pressures on individual and 
social wages, a redistribution of income in favour of capital, and decreasing costs of 
constant capital (especially of raw materials)), the profit rate went up sharply. 
Nevertheless, Wallerstein=s expectation of a >global profit squeeze=xxv is plausible in the 
long run.  
Since the 1960s, in the industrialised countries rates of productivity growth, although 
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declining, have still been higher than the rate of growth of manufacturing output.xxvi The 
consequence has been the dismissal of workers and the emergence of an >employment 
gap=. Growth tends to become >jobless growth= B a development that can only be 
counteracted by a reduction of working time or the creation of jobs in the public and non-
manufacturing private sector. The historical reduction of working hours per person 
described by Maddison reduces society=s growth potential, but at the same time it 
provides a partial solution to the problem of the >employment gap=. In Europe between 
1973 and 1992 the number of people in employment rose from 138 to 148 million, while 
there was a 5% decrease in the number of hours worked B from 242 to 232 billion.xxvii  
 
This table summarises the long-term development of productivity (output per hour 
worked) and growth (output in manufacturing). From the end of the 1970s until the mid-
1990s only Japan and Canada achieved an output-growth equal to productivity-growth; 
all other industrialised countries display the pattern, which Maddison discovered as a 
long-term tendency from the early 19th century until the 1990s. The picture, however, 
changes when long-term GDP-growth is compared with growth rates of 
GDP per person employed, because the growth rate of labour productivity in services as 
compared 
Table 2: 
Annual percentage changes of output per hour and output in manufacturing in 10 
industrialised countries; 1979-1995 
  
Country 
 
 
USA 
 
Ca 
 
Japan 
 
Bel 
 
F 
 
D 
 
I 
 
NL 
 
S 
 
GB 
 
Output 
 
 
2.1 
 
1.7 
 
3.4 
 
2.0 
 
0.7 
 
0.4 
 
2.3 
 
2.0 
 
2.1 
 
0.7 
 
Output 
per hour 
 
2.6 
 
1.7 
 
3.4 
 
3.9 
 
3.1 
 
2.2 
 
3.8 
 
3.3 
 
3.3 
 
4.2 
Source: Sparks/ Greiner 1997: 29 
 
 with manufacturing generally is lower. The growth of >unproductive labour=xxviii has the 
effect of diminished productivity increases. Owing in particular to the growing weight of 
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financial services in production and sales (for instance in the motorcar industry it has 
reached about 70%), Aunproductive@ labour partly offsets the productivity increases 
achieved by Aproductive@ labourxxix and hence also the resulting widening employment 
gap. But because of the introduction of new communication-technologies into the service 
sector, this sector is likely to display higher rates of productivity growth in the future B a 
scenario already announced by the advocates of the >new economy= B so there are no 
guarantees that the service sector=s capacity to absorb a substantial part of the labour 
force can be sustained in the long run.  
 
There are no easy solutions for the employment gap in dynamic capitalist societies. That 
is, structural unemployment must be considered an inevitable consequence of a strongly 
performing economy. It is not, however, a state of affairs that people happily and 
voluntarily resign themselves to, although economists are prompt to justify it with the 
NAIRU-formula. The Left has always pursued >alternative= (i.e. non-market) policies for 
achieving full employment. As the space for such alternative projects has sharply 
contracted, increasingly often the only remaining choice is for people to >exit= from the 
system of paid employment. This can take the form of a passive acceptance of 
unemployment and its consequences or the active organisation of new forms of labour. 
The latter way out refers to nothing but the >informal sector=, which is growing in all parts 
of the world and thus reducing the employment gap. The ILO notes that more than 80% 
of new jobs created in Latin America and Africa in recent years have been in the informal 
economy.xxx We return to the >informal sector= in section 5 below. 
 
4 Ecological Limits to Growth and Productivity 
High productivity increases constitute one of the basic features of industrial capitalism in 
general and of the Fordist system in particular. For this reason, productivity growth forms 
the starting point of Adam Smith=s analysis of the >origins of the wealth of nations=:xxxi 
specialization and a deepening of the division of labor help to increase the output per 
working hour, and this causes income and wealth to rise. David Ricardo extended the 
argument to the international division of labour, based on free trade. His >law of 
comparative advantage= still serves as one of the most important theoretical foundations 
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of modern economics, and is even enthusiastically embraced by the modern, 
Eurocentric globalisation literature.xxxii  
 
Leaving aside the effects of efficiency gains, productivity can only be increased by 
putting more fixed capital into circulation and by consuming ever-larger quantities of 
matter and energy, as living labour is replaced by fossil energy and machinery.xxxiii By 
means of this substitution, capital becomes more and more independent of living labour. 
At the same time, however, the reproduction of capital(ism) as a whole is crucially 
dependent on the production of (surplus) value which can only be produced by labour. 
This contradiction has not been resolved since the inception of the capitalist mode of 
production. Fordism, too, cannot be understood as a mere technical and social 
innovation. It also includes a new relationship to nature, for both the system of 
production and consumption and the mode of social regulation are heavily based on the 
use of fossil energy.xxxiv  
 
It is clear that the material preconditions of the >Western life style= cannot be established 
in all societies on earth without destroying nature to the point where human life on earth 
is jeopardised.xxxv  At the limits of environmental space, the goods needed for production 
and consumption become >oligarchic=, i.e. reserved for an oligarchy able to secure its 
access to these resources with monetary claims. Those who do not possess monetary 
wealth are increasingly excluded from the consumption of goods and services. 
Consequently the number of poor people in the world is rising; in 1998 the World Bank 
counted 2.8 billion human beings living below the international poverty line of $2 per 
capita per day.xxxvi  
Serious studies on the carrying capacity of global ecosystems and on the concept of 
>environmental space= have demonstrated that they set objective limits to the process of 
economic growth.xxxvii Since the Rio Conference of 1992, it has become common sense 
that fossil resources are not only limited, but that their excessive use is responsible for 
the greenhouse effect and other ecological evils. It is in this way that the question of 
ecological sustainability asserts itself and reshapes the discourse of the social sciences 
in general and that of the economics of growth in particular. This should be sufficient 
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reason to jettison any illusions concerning the benign nature of economic and financial 
globalisation. Moreover Western liberal (formal) democracy could only be globalised if 
the >Western way of life= itself could be globalised. But a situation of genuine globality, 
i.e. a world society based on equality and reciprocity (if not on solidarity) will never be 
achieved through capitalist globalisation. 
  
5 Financial Limits to Growth 
The interest rate constitutes a benchmark (>hard budget constraint=)xxxviii for any economic 
undertaking. If capitalists fail to make a profit at least equal to the prevailing interest rate, 
their capital will be classified as non-profitable and thus non-performing. As long as the 
real interest rate is lower than the real growth rate of GDP and of the >marginal efficiency 
of capital= (i.e. the profit rate), returns from productive investments will exceed the 
monetary price of capital, and therefore borrowers in financial markets are likely to invest 
their loans in the real economy. This >Keynesian state of affairs= came to an end, 
however, at the same time as the >golden age= of Fordist expansion, namely in the 
course of the 1970s. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the real interest rates on global 
financial markets have by far exceeded the average real growth rate of GDP.xxxix The real 
economy is >depressed= by the financial system. The OECD gives three reasons for this 
configuration of finance and production: first, the growing fiscal deficits and the 
accumulation of public debt in the highly developed countries; second, higher inflationary 
risks and consequently a greater weight of risk factors in the formation of interest rates; 
and third, the globalisation of financial markets since the second half of the 1970s, with 
the result that deregulated market mechanisms rather than public interventions began to 
exercise the function of credit allocating.xl The political project of deregulation, 
liberalisation, flexibilisation and privatisation, thus, has intensified global competition with 
regard to the stability of currencies and profitability of assets. The growing opportunities 
of exploiting interplace-differentials of profitability on a global scale together with 
technical (information and communication technologies) and financial innovations (from 
hedge funds to derivatives and offshore financial centres) can be considered as the main 
impulse of globalisation. 
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Unrecognized by the OECD, however, is a fourth reason for the high real interest rates 
that have prevailed since the beginning of the 1980s: the crisis of American hegemony. 
The US trade balance deficit since 1971 (due to the outflow of capital) and the 
deterioration of the current account since the mid-1970s, together with the breakdown of 
the fixed exchange rate system of Bretton Woods, exerted downward pressure on the 
exchange rate of the US dollar, and spurred on inflation. A further deterioration of the 
(still hegemonic) dollar could only be prevented by means of an increase in US interest 
rates.xli The period of high interest rates began in 1979 under the Carter administration 
and was rigorously continued by the Reagan administration. Its effects on the US 
exchange rate were positive, but proved devastating for debtors B in the USA (e.g. the 
Savings & Loans crisis), but above all in the Third World. The combination of high 
interest rates, rising oil prices and declining commodity prices triggered a Third World 
debt crisis, which has still not been overcome 20 years later. Table 2 shows the relation 
between real long-term interest rates and real growth of GDP in highly developed 
countries. 
 
According to the traditional Keynesian paradigm, the accumulation of capital is financed 
with loans provided by >monetary wealth owners=, i.e. by banks and institutional 
investors. The interest rate compels industrial capitalists to produce a profit that is large 
enough to service their loans as well as to fulfil their own accumulation requirements. In 
this way, the interest rate is linked to profits, employment and real capital accumulation, 
i.e. to the social organisation of the accumulation regime and its political regulation. The 
interest rate itself is subject to regulation by (national) monetary authorities, above all the 
Central Bank. Although it is still a central premise of Keynesian theory, globalisation has 
by now significantly eroded the ability of national monetary authorities to determine 
interest rates, which are nowadays, formed on global financial markets. On the one 
hand, arbitrage between different markets equalises interest rate (and exchange rate) 
differentials; on the other hand, the differentials (calculated in >basis points=) are 
continuously recreated, triggering new rounds of speculation. 
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Table 3 
Real growth rates and long term real interest rates in industrialised countries, 1960 B 
1995 
 
 
 
 
Real GDP  
(annual growth rates in per cent per 
annum) 
 
 
Real Long Term Interest rates 
(per cent per annum) 
 
 
 
60-73
 
74-79 
 
80-89
 
90-95
 
60-73
 
74-79 
 
80-89 
 
90-95
 
USA 
 
4.0
 
2.6 
 
2.4
 
1.9
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Those who lend out monetary wealth (e.g. shares in firms or funds, or government 
bonds) thereby become claim holders. The international financial system works as a 
very powerful device for channelling surplus produced anywhere in the world to financial 
claim holders in the big financial centres. As a result, inequality is rising drastically. 
However, there are so many intermediaries in the chain between monetary claims, debt 
service and surplus transfer in real terms that under normal conditions these links are 
rarely visible for people and become recognisable only in times of crisis. The financial 
system seems to be a >virtual world= without any influence on production and 
reproduction, i.e. on people=s living conditions and the natural environment. It is also 
often regarded as a kind of >zero sum game= among players in the virtual world of the 
stock market: some lose what others gain and vice versa, and nothing real  happens. In 
reality it is another mechanism whereby financial asset holders gain at the expense of 
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those who do not belong to this enviable species. US figures indicate that between 1989 
and 1997, 86% of stock market gains went to the top 10% of households, while between 
1983 and 1995 the bottom 40% of households lost 80% of their net worth.xlii  
These facts are in stark contrast with the World Bank=s claim that there is a positive >1-
to-1-relation= between growth and poverty alleviation. The >post-modern= understanding 
of the financial system as de-linked from the real world of production and distribution is 
completely inadequate for grasping the contradictions and crisis tendencies generated 
by the global financial system. Although global markets rely in principle on private 
initiative, the role of the state is indispensable for the working of the system. In fact, 
nation-states as well as international institutions provide the framework for the social and 
economic (world) order. With respect to global finance, however, the role of the state, as 
a public debtor vis-à-vis private monetary wealth owners, is that of a direct participant.  
 
The private financial system is fundamentally flawed because wealth owners (and claim 
holders) are private agents, whereas debtors in most cases are public institutions B or 
they become public ones when private debtors default. The debt crisis of the 1980s was, 
above all, caused by the default on public debt, whereas the debt crisis of the 1990s was 
one of private debt default. This change was an outcome of the policies of deregulation 
and privatisation, which have been pursued by international institutions and national 
governments alike.  
 
The Keynesian (as well as Marxian) notion of debtors as private (industrial) capitalists 
who service their debt by extracting and realising surplus value has lost its validity in the 
era of global financial speculation. The debt service of private monetary claims has 
become >socialised=: governments are made to pass on the costs to their citizens. This is 
the reason why public debt has increased so remarkably in nearly all countries during 
the last 20 years. Where neither private debtors nor national states are in a position to 
service private debt, international institutions (notably the IMF) provide new credits on 
condition that the country in question adopts a policy package of structural adjustment. 
The primary aim of debt crisis management is to safeguard the assets of claim-holders 
from industrialised countries, and thus prevent a >systemic crisis=. In the medium and 
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long term, these policies channel resources from the citizens of the indebted country to 
claim-holders in other countries. Thus the redistribution of real wealth (surplus value) 
between creditors and debtors is organised by official institutions, not just by the market. 
This is one of the ways in which capitalism contradicts >free market= ideology; the latter=s 
presentation of capitalist reality contrasts ever more sharply with people=s experience of 
it. 
In most cases, so-called >emerging markets= are characterised by high real growth rates 
and/or high nominal interest rates, both serving to attract foreign capital. When the 
growth rate declines or the currency is expected to depreciate, foreign capital 
immediately exits the >emerging market= in order not to >submerge=. The result of such 
capital flight is a further depreciation of the currency. In the cases of the Asian countries, 
Mexico, Brazil and Russia, currencies depreciated between 50 and 80%. For several 
reasons, the effects were devastating: (1) the foreign debt to be serviced, which is 
denominated in foreign currency, shot up; (2) higher export volumes were required in 
order to earn constant export revenues; (3) higher import prices put an inflationary 
pressure on the economy; (4) for those who had hard currency at their disposal, whether 
citizens or foreigners, asset prices fell. The global extension of financial claims thus 
turns out to be a much more efficient device for the transfer of real value and the 
intensification of exploitation than, for instance, the plundering activities conducted under 
colonial rule from the 16th century onwards. The operating mode of the global credit 
system annihilates the potential comparative cost advantages of free trade. It follows yet 
again that the 1-to-1-relation between growth and poverty eradication, posited by the 
World Bank, is false. 
 
While on the one hand financial capital exerts deflationary pressures on prices of 
commodities, on the other hand it produces an inflation of asset prices. This paradoxical 
situation of an >inflationary deflation=xliii is an indicator of the extent to which the global 
financial system has become disconnected from the real economy. The financial boom 
takes place alongside overproduction and overcapacity in the real economy: >There is 
too much of everything. From cashmere to blue jeans, silver jewellry to aluminium 
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cans...Asia is the epicenter of the problem. Massive investment made on the assumption 
of continued high rates of growth resulted in broad overcapacityY=xliv  
 
The post-war configuration of international institutions was tailored for a world of 
constant and moderate rates of inflation; it was designed to counter the deflationary 
pressures, which had proved so destructive after the great crisis of 1929. During the 
1930s, deflationary tendencies had resulted in a nearly complete collapse of the world 
market and nation-states= subsequent resort to protectionist measures and aggressively 
autarchic policies. Low nominal interest rates cause stock market quotations to rise. 
However, in connection with the deflationary tendencies of product prices and real 
growth rates, even low real interest rates do not trigger new investment in the real 
economy because of low profitability. A situation characterised by these tendencies is 
extremely unstable and may cause the collapse of companies which suddenly find 
themselves in deep debt. This is the situation which Keynes referred to as a >liquidity 
trap=: although nominal interest rates are low, even near zero, nobody borrows because 
investments are not even expected to produce the minimum profit rate. Under such 
circumstances, it makes sense for individuals to transfer their liquid funds to places 
where they can earn higher short-term profits. 
 
Nowadays, owners of monetary wealth, rather than >traditional= industrial capitalists, 
determine the process of global accumulation. The real rate of return on capital is of less 
relevance for investment decisions than monetary interest rates. But the process of 
disembedding and de-linking has not created a completely autonomous financial sphere. 
The effects of the global financial system constitute the lived experience of people in 
countries hit by financial crises. The government of Indonesia speaks of at least 30 
million people living below the poverty line. In Thailand, poverty and informalisation are 
growing visibly. In Russia, hunger and malnutrition have returned on a broad scale. In 
large parts of the country money has disappeared and a pre-modern barter economy is 
on the rise B a different kind of >virtual economy=.xlv Although the empirical data are better 
for some cases than for others, the tendency in other countries hit by the crisis is 
basically the same. In Mexico, for instance, the losses of gross domestic product 
induced by the financial crisis of 1994/ 95 are calculated as having reached 18% of 
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GDP. All this points to the fact that the financial system continues to have a profound 
impact on real accumulation, labour and political regulation.  
 
6. Conclusion: Growth, Nature, Employment and Money 
The problems discussed above arise because both productivity growth and real interest 
rates have for decades been considerably higher than real growth rates. These are 
expressions of the declining profit rate on capital in most parts of the world.xlvi 
Unemployment and inequality are increasing on a global scale. For many, the most 
obvious and convenient way out of this precarious situation appears to be the stimulation 
of economic growth. In most policy proposals of national governments, international 
institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank, research institutes or the media, the 
stimulation of growth is understood as a panacea capable of resolving each and every 
global problem. But not only are there economic obstacles to an increase of real growth 
rates, there are also serious ecological limits to further quantitative growth (which, to be 
sure, also make themselves felt in economic terms). The question then becomes: is it 
possible to reduce the real interest rate or to curb the growth of labour productivity, 
rather than to continue to stimulate the real growth rate of GDP? 
 
Lowering the interest rate was Keynes= proposal for the creation of new jobs. If the 
marginal efficiency of capital (the profit rate) could not be increased, the interest rate 
should be decreased (the >euthanasia of the rentier=).xlvii However, this remedy is 
premised on the sovereignty of the monetary authorities with regard to the determination 
of the interest rate. As a result of market deregulation, exchange rate liberalisation, and 
financial innovations, the formation of the interest rate on global financial markets can no 
longer be significantly influenced by national central banks. And global institutions with 
an adequate control over financial markets do not exist. Even the reform proposals 
developed after the Asian crisis of 1997 (e.g. by the >Global Financial Stability Forum=) 
do not go beyond recommendations for more transparency, prudent behaviour, 
improved surveillance, monitoring and safeguards; there is no suggestion for 
interventions into the working of financial markets.  
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Germany=s former finance minister, Oskar Lafontaine, tried to establish a degree of 
political control over global interest rates (by capping them) and exchange rates (by 
introducing target zones). He was well aware that such a project could only be realised 
in co-operation with the European Central Bank and in co-ordination with the other G7 
(G8)-governments. But Lafontaine=s proposals were indignantly rejected by >the 
markets=, the big TNCs, the >independent= central bankers, public opinion, members of 
his own government, and B last but not least B leading mainstream economists. 
Lafontaine=s project was the last attempt to break out of the dominant growth discourse 
and to reconquer economic policy sovereignty from >the global markets=.  
 
There is a third possible solution: reducing the rate of productivity growth. However, 
economic growth takes place through competition and is thus based on individual 
countries= efforts to improve their competitive position; this, in turn, requires increases in 
productivity. This means that the discourse of globalisation and competitiveness 
inevitably relies on productivity and the required  conditions to improving it. This view 
was very clearly expressed by the Brazilian President Fernando Enrique Cardoso: 
 
>Globalisation means competition founded on higher levels of productivity. That is to say 
more output per unit of labour. Unemployment has therefore resulted from the very 
reason that makes an economy successfully competitive.... Flexibility of labour relations 
should also result in lower costs for the hiring of workers... In countries with large 
populations such as Brazil and India consideration must also be given to the operation of 
the so-called informal economy as far as job creation is concerned ...=.xlviii  
 
The consequence of >successful= adjustment to the challenges of globalisation is thus the 
creation of a dual economy: a formal part, competitive and highly productive, and an 
informal part that serves to absorb dismissed workers precisely because it is in general 
less productive than the formal one.xlix The rise of the informal  economy obviously 
provides a >solution= for the problem of growing unemployment. Its detrimental effects on 
labour conditions, wages, social security, health conditions and so on become virtues in 
the era of globalisation and under an accumulation regime or growth model which 
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excludes growing parts of the global labour force from the formal employment system. 
The percentages of informal labour in total employment in >Third-World= countries range 
from 30% in Chile to 84% in Uganda.l In Latin America, between 1990 and 1996 the 
share of informal employment in non-agricultural sectors increased from 51.6% in 1990 
to 57.4% in 1996.li In rural areas the percentage of informal work was even higher; the 
Brazilian statistical office (IBGE) considers as much as 90% of the labour force as 
informal. In Central and Eastern Europe, too, the transition to a market economy and the 
crisis of 1997 pushed many workers out of the formal into the informal sector, and even 
in highly developed European countries, informal labour is also becoming more and 
more important. The percentage of people employed in the so-called >shadow economy= 
constitutes between 7% and 16%, depending on the measure used, not counting the 
roughly 15% of the labour force which is self-employed.lii 
 
Informal labour, although normally less productive than formal labour, does not need to 
be considered as unproductive in the Marxian sense. Therefore, the tendency of 
informalisation may be a (partial) solution to the employment problem, which does not 
exert pressure on the average profit rate. In fact, since wage costs in the formal sector 
are also influenced by the low level of pay for informal labour, the effect on the average 
profit rate is in all likelihood positive, particularly in those industries where big 
corporations take advantage of the informal labour of local suppliers.liii We need to 
consider the possibility that globalisation offers new opportunities for capital to whipsaw 
working people. On the one hand, capital will try to increase the profit rate and boost 
productivity by the continued forced flexibilisation of labour and wages. On the other 
hand, it will push redundant workers into the informal sector where they supply low-paid 
labour, engage in self-employment for local and regional markets, or organise services 
compensating for the functions that the welfare state has abandoned under pressure 
from capital. 
 
The growth of the informal sector thus seems to offer a partial solution to the problem of 
unemployment. Much, though, depends on the measurement of productivity that is 
applied. Normally, this is labour input (in hours worked) against saleable output. This 
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system of measure is not arbitrary; it is an outcome of >occidental rationality=, the 
prevailing definitions of property rights, and the associated tendency to compare 
competitiveness in highly integrated world markets in monetary terms. Nevertheless, 
there is another way of measuring that would make sense: labour input over the whole 
life cycle of a product including repairing, tuning and updating the product, and including 
the non-traded outputs of production, i.e. externalised pollution. A procedure of this kind 
could extend the rules of >least cost planning= already used in energy markets to the 
markets for other products. Unfortunately, such a system of measuring would not be 
voluntarily accepted by >the markets=. Markets and competition enforce acceleration, 
whereas environmental sustainability requires a policy of deceleration, i.e. restraining 
productivity increases. 
 
Since growth stimulation fails to address the problems of unemployment, inequality and 
economic instability, a more viable solution could be provided by a combination of new 
forms of regulation of global financial markets in order to reduce the real interest rate, 
and a deceleration of productivity growth by means of an expansion of informal sectors 
and/or a transition to ecologically more sustainable production (and consumption) 
patterns (and lifestyles). Public awareness of the economic, financial, ecological, and 
social problems raised by globalisation and their possible solutions still has to be created 
B e.g. by social movements and NGOs. Without it, the illusory faith in >growth triumphant= 
is bound to live on and fuel further deregulation measures B while failing to overcome the 
crisis. At the end of the day, growth will stagnate or decline, the environment will 
deteriorate further and the poor will remain poor and grow ever more numerous B all 
because of the simple-minded notion that growth rates can be advanced even while the 
limits of the environmental space have been reached and the real economy is depressed 
by real interest rates higher than the sustainable rate of real GDP growth. In an era of 
globalisation, the conventional paradigm of economic policy is in need of radical 
rethinking. This statement, however, leads us to the conclusion that after decades of 
deregulation and globalisation it is necessary to devise new forms of political regulation 
on different levels from the local to the global in order to partly re-embed the 
disembedded global capitalist system into society. This is an objective, which also 
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stands behind the global movements against de-civilised capitalism from Seattle to 
Davos... 
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